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Abstract—Carrier aggregation, which allows users to aggregate
several component carriers to obtain up to 100 MHz of band-
width, is one of the central features envisioned for next generation
cellular networks. While this feature will enable support for
higher data rates and improve quality of service, it may also
be employed as an effective interference mitigation technique,
especially in multi-tier heterogeneous networks. Having in mind
that the aggregated component carriers may belong to different
frequency bands and, hence, have varying propagation profiles,
we argue that it is not necessary, indeed even harmful, to
transmit at maximum power at all carriers, at all times. Rather,
by using game theory, we design a distributed algorithm that
lets eNodeBs and micro base stations dynamically adjust the
downlink transmit power for the different component carriers.
We compare our scheme to different power strategies combined
with popular interference mitigation techniques, in a typical
large-scale scenario, and show that our solution significantly
outperforms the other strategies in terms of global network
utility, power consumption and user throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
The exponential increase in mobile data traffic in recent
years has become a serious challenge for today’s cellular
communication networks. Heterogeneous Networks (HetNets)
are seen as a potential cost-efficient approach to effectively
meet the challenge, by introducing smaller cells, i.e., micro,
pico and femtocells, nested within the traditional macrocell.
This approach promises to improve both the capacity and
the coverage of current cellular networks. However, it also
introduces severe interference between different architectural
layers when sharing the same spectrum resources.
Carrier aggregation is another expected feature of future
networks, which aims at guaranteeing higher data rates for end
users so as to meet the IMT-Advanced requirements. It enables
the concurrent use of several LTE component carriers with,
potentially, different bandwidth and belonging to different
frequency bands [1].
Currently, three main approaches have been proposed to
mitigate downlink interference in HetNets. The first approach
relies on pre-assigning different component carriers to each
tier in the HetNet so as to nullify inter-tier interference [2].
The second approach, which has been adopted in LTE-A sys-
tems, known as Enhanced Inter Cell Interference Coordination
(eICIC) includes techniques such as Cell Range Expansion to
incentivise users to associate with micro base stations (BSs),
and Almost Blank Subframes (ABS), i.e., subframes during
which macro BSs mute their transmissions to alleviate the in-
terference caused to microcells. Algorithms to optimise biasing
coefficients and ABS patterns in LTE HetNets [3] as well as
modifications which allow macro BSs to transmit at reduced
power during ABS [2] have been already proposed, however
they do not address carrier aggregation. In this paper we do
not consider a solution within the framework of eICIC or its
modifications, rather we use them as comparison benchmarks
for the solutions we propose.
We adopt instead a third approach, which consists in prop-
erly setting the downlink transmit power so as to avoid inter-
ference between different tiers. Indeed, macro BSs transmitting
blindly at high power ensures large coverage and an acceptable
level of service for all users under coverage, but it can also
create a lot of harmful interference to microcell users.
In this paper we address the problem of downlink power
setting in LTE HetNets with carrier aggregation support, when
all BSs share the available radio resources. Carrier aggregation
allows all carrier aggregation enabled users in the network to
receive concurrently in two or more component carriers, while
they are under their coverage areas. The coverage area of each
component carrier is determined by the carrier’s propagation
characteristics, as well its transmitting power, therefore it is
possible that some users may be under the coverage of one
carrier and not others. We propose to leverage this diversity
in the component carrier coverage areas to mitigate inter-
tier interference in HetNets. Fixed configurations in which
different carriers transmit at different powers have also been
envisioned by by 3GPP [7], however, our aim is to reach such
solutions dynamically and in-response to real traffic demand.
As envisioned in LTE-A systems, we consider that each
component carrier at each BS has an independent power
budget, and that BSs can choose the transmit power on each
carrier from a set of discrete possible values. This implies
that the problem we face is not to properly allocate the power
among the different carriers to ensure most efficient use of a
power budget, as done in existing work. Rather, we address
the problem of adequately choosing a power level from a
range of choices to ensure optimal network performance. The
complexity of the problem increases exponentially with the
number of cells, carriers and the granularity of the power levels
available to the BSs. In addition, if one of the objectives is to
maximise the network throughput, the problem becomes non
linear since transmission data rates depend on the signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) experienced by the users.
It follows that an optimal solution requiring a centralised
approach would be both unfeasible and unrealistic, given the
large number of cells in the network and the flat network
architecture of LTE-A.
We therefore study the above problem through the lens
of game theory, which is an excellent mathematical tool to
obtain a multi-objective distributed solution in a scenario with
entities (BSs) sharing the same pool of resources (available
component carriers). We model the problem as a competi-
tive game between teams of BSs and prove that the game
we model belongs to the class of pseudo-potential games,
which are known to admit pure Nash Equilibria (NE) [8].
This allows us to propose a distributed algorithm based on
best-reply dynamics that enables the network to dynamically
reach an NE representing the preferred solution in terms of
throughput, user coverage and power consumption. As shown
by simulation results, our scheme outperforms fixed transmit
power strategies, even when advanced interference mitigation
techniques such as eICIC are employed.
II. RELATED WORK
We focus our discussion on existing works on power control
in cellular networks, since they are the most relevant to our
study. Note that, while many papers have appeared in the
literature on uplink power control, fewer exist on downlink
power setting. Among these, [4] uses coalitional games to
investigate power and resource allocation in HetNets where
cooperation between players is allowed. Downlink power al-
location in cellular networks is modeled in [5] as a Stackelberg
game, with macro and femto BSs competing to maximise their
individual capacities under power constraints.
An energy efficient approach is instead proposed in [9].
There, BSs do not select transmit power levels as we do in
our work, rather they can only choose between on and off
states. Maximising energy efficiency is also the goal of [10],
which however is limited to the study of resource allocation
and downlink transmit power in a two-tier LTE single cell. A
multi-cell network with inter-cell interference is considered in
[6], where energy efficiency is optimised by applying resource
allocation and discrete transmit power levels.
We remark that the above papers address HetNets but,
unlike our work, they do not consider carrier aggregation
support. Also, [4], [5], [10] formulate a resource allocation
problem that aims at distributing the transmit power among
the available resources under overall power constraints. In
our work, instead, we do not formulate the problem as a
downlink power allocation problem, rather as a power set-
ting problem at carrier level, assuming each carrier has an
independent power budget. Additionally, while most of the
previous work [6], [9], [10] focus on the HetNet interference
problem only, using game theory concepts we jointly address
interference mitigation, power consumption and user coverage
by taking advantage of the diversity and flexibility provided
by the availability of multiple component carriers. Finally, we
propose a solution that enables the BSs to dynamically change
their power strategies based on user distribution, propagation
conditions and traffic patterns.
To our knowledge, the only existing work that investigates
downlink power setting in LTE networks with carrier ag-
gregation support is [11]. There, the authors formulate an
optimisation problem that aims at maximising the system
energy efficiency by optimising power allocation and user
association. However, interference issues, which are one of
the main challenges we address, are largely ignored in [11] as
the authors consider a non-heterogeneous single cell scenario.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a two-tier LTE network composed of macro
BSs controlling macrocells, and micro BSs controlling micro-
cells. For simplicity, the user equipments (UEs) in the network
area are all assumed to be carrier aggregation (CA) enabled.
Note, however, that the extension to a higher number of tiers
as well as to the case where there is a mix of CA-enabled and
non CA-enabled UEs is straightforward.
The network area is partitioned into a set of tiles, or
zones, denoted by Z . From the perspective of downlink power
setting, propagation conditions within a tile from a specific
BS represent averages of the conditions experienced by the
UEs within the tile. The tile size can be arbitrarily set, and
represents a trade-off between complexity and realism.
Also, the tile-BS association is determined by the mobile
operator network planning. In particular, following [12], we
will assume for ease of presentation that tiles (i.e., the UEs
therein) are associated with the closest BS, although the
extension to other, dynamic association schemes as well as
to the case where a tile is served by multiple BSs can be
easily obtained.
All BSs share the same radio resources. In particular, a
comprehensive set of component carriers (CC), indicated by
C, is available simultaneously at all BSs (BSs having at their
disposal a subset of CCs is a sub-case of this scenario).
Each CC is defined by a central frequency and a certain
bandwidth. The central frequency affects the carrier’s coverage
area, as the propagation conditions deteriorate greatly with
increasing frequency. The level of transmit power irradiated
by each BS on the available CCs can be updated periodically
depending on the traffic and propagation conditions in the
served tiles, or it can be triggered by changes in such network
parameters. The update time interval, however, is expected
to be substantially longer than a resource block allocation
period, e.g., order of hundreds of subframes. The BSs can
choose from a discrete set of available power levels, including
0 that corresponds to switching off the CC. The possible power
values are expressed as fractions of the maximum transmit
power, i.e., P = {0.1, 0.2, ..., 1}, with the maximum transmit
power that typically depends on the type of BS. As noted
before, each CC at each BS has an independent power budget.
In order to determine the downlink power setting, BSs
can leverage the feedback they receive from their users on
the channel quality that UEs experience. Also, we assume
that each macro BS is connected with the set of micro
BSs underlaid over its coverage area, via, e.g., optical fiber
connections, which allows for swift communication between
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Fig. 1. Network model and teams. Team locations are denoted by l1, l2, l3.
Solid red lines represent team boundaries, while black solid lines represent
coverage areas. Tiles are represented by grey squares.
them. As a result, we assume that it is possible for the
macro BS and the corresponding micro BSs to cooperate and
exchange information in order to reach common decisions.
This is a reasonable assumption since it is expected that the
architecture foreseen for future networks will allow BSs that
are geographically close to share a common baseband [13].
Furthermore, it is fair to assume that neighbouring macro BSs
can communicate with each other.
IV. GAME THEORY APPROACH
As mentioned, the complexity of carrier power setting may
be very high and impair an optimal, centralised solution in
networks with many cells. We therefore adopt a game theoretic
approach to the problem, which provides a low-complexity,
distributed solution that is applicable in realistic scenarios.
We formulate the problem of power setting in LTE HetNets
with carrier aggregation as a competitive game between teams
of BSs (see Fig. 1), where each team wants to maximize
its own payoff. Indeed, given the network architecture at
hand, a macro BS and the micro BSs within its coverage
area, have the common objective to provide the UEs located
within the geographical area of the macrocell with a high
data throughput. Thus, they may choose to cooperate with
each other in order to improve their individual payoffs as well
as contribute to the “public good” of the team. Cooperation
between such BSs is beneficial especially since the inter-tier
interference is most significant within the cell. At the same
time, although increasing the transmit power of one BS may
increase the SINR that its UEs experience, such increase hurts
the UEs being served by other BSs since all BSs share the
same frequency spectrum. It follows that teams will compete
between each other for the same resources, each aiming at
maximising its own benefits.
The game we model and its analysis are detailed below.
We remark that the formulation can be easily extended to
accommodate various team configurations and clusters of
teams controlled by a central controller.
A. Game definition
Let T = {t1, ..., tT } be the set of teams in our network,
where T is the number of teams. Each team consists of a macro
BS and the micro BSs whose coverage areas geographically
overlap with that of the macro BS. Note that not only can team
players exchange information between each other, but we can
also assume that the macro BS plays the role of team leader,
i.e., it makes the decisions for all team members in a way that
maximizes the overall team benefits.
To generalise the formulation further, we will refer to
the BSs forming a team t as the locations of the team,
Lt = {l1, l2, ..., lL} where, for simplicity of notation, the
number of locations within a team is assumed to be constant
and equal to L. Such a generalisation is particularly useful
since the interference caused within the team depends also on
the relative position between the different players. We indicate
the set of tiles under the coverage area of a particular location
l by Zl, and their union, denoting the comprehensive set of
tiles of the team, by Zt. Also, let us denote by Ez the number
of UEs in tile z, and by Et the total number of UEs served
by a team.
Each team, comprising a set of locations (BSs located at
different positions within the macrocell), has to decide which
transmit power level to use (out of the possible values in P ),
at each one of those locations and for each of the available
carriers C = {c1, c2, ..., cC}. It follows that the strategy
selected by a team t, st, is an L×C matrix, where each (l, c)
entry indicates the power level set at location l on carrier c.
We now provide the definitions for the team utility and
payoff, which are used in game theory to model the objectives
of the players when choosing their strategy. Since network
throughput is an important performance metric, it is natural
that the utility of each team is defined as a function of the
data rates it can serve to its UEs. The data rate a UE obtains
is closely linked to the SINR it experiences, which depends
on the transmit power chosen by the serving location (BS),
the CC that is used and the transmit power levels chosen
by neighbouring locations. Assuming that all UEs within the
same tile experience the same amount of interference, for
each team we can first define an interference matrix of size
|Zt|×C, denoted by It. Each entry in the matrix indicates the
interference experienced by UEs in tile z on carrier c, which
is caused by other teams:
Itz,c(s
−t) =
∑
t′∈T ∧t′ 6=t
∑
l′∈Lt′
st
′
l′,cal′,z,c (IV.1)
where s−t represents the strategies adopted by all teams
other than t, st
′
l′,c is the power level (the strategy) of team
t′ for location l′ on carrier c and al′,z,c is the factor of
the attenuation (0 ≤ al′,z,c ≤ 1) experienced by the signal
transmitted from location l′ on c when it reaches the UEs
in tile z. The attenuation values are pre-calculated using the
urban propagation models specified in [14].
The SINR at tile z, when served by location l in team t, is:
γtz,c =
stl,cal,z,c
N +
∑
l′∈Lt∧l′ 6=l al′,z,cs
t
l′,c + I
t
z,c
(IV.2)
where N represents the average noise power level. Note
that, besides N and Itz,c, we have an additional term in the
denominator, which stands for the intra-team interference and
indicates the sum of all power received from the locations
within the same team, other than location l.
Then the utility of each team can be defined as a function
of the individual tiles’ SINR values. In particular, the sigmoid-
like function has been often used for this purpose in uplink
power control [15]. We note that this function is suited to
capture also the utility in downlink power setting, as it has
features that closely resemble the realistic relationship between
the SINR and the data rate.
We therefore adopt the sigmoid function proposed in [15],
as the utility function of each (tile, carrier) duplet in the team,
and write the team utility as:
ut(st, s−t) =
∑
l∈Lt
∑
z∈Zl
∑
c∈C
Ez
Et
(
1 + e−α(γtz,c−β)
) . (IV.3)
The sigmoid function in Eq. (IV.3) has two tuneable param-
eters, α, which controls the steepness of the function, and β,
which controls its centre. They can be tweaked to best meet the
scenario of interest. In particular, the higher the α, the closer
the function resembles a step function, i.e., the utility becomes
more discontinuous with the increase of the SINR. The higher
the β, the larger the SINR for which a tile obtains a positive
utility (see Sec. VI for the setting of these parameters). Also,
the individual utility of each tile z in team t is weighted by
the fraction of UEs covered by the team in the tile (Ez/Et) so
as to give more weight to more populated tiles. This enables
us to account for the user spatial distribution whenever this is
not uniform over the network area.
Next, we introduce a cost function to account for the
interference and its detrimental effect, as well as for fairness in
the service level to users. We define a first cost component that
aims at penalising players who choose high power strategies,
as: ξ
∑
l∈Lt
∑
c∈C a¯l,cs
t
l,c where a¯l,c is the link quality on
carrier c averaged over all tiles served by location l, and ξ
is the unit price per received power. This cost component
increases with the increase in the chosen level of transmit
power, however it also accounts for the propagation conditions
of the users served by the location. In other words, locations
that have to serve UEs experiencing poor channel quality will
incur a lower cost, which ensures some level of fairness. Ad-
ditionally, as clear by intuition and as shown in our technical
report [16], the parameter ξ can be optimally set so as to be
inversely proportional to the average interference that the team
experiences from other teams. This way the cost component
will be smaller for a team that experiences high interference
thus rightfully pushing the team to increase its transmit power.
We note that the optimal setting of ξ is a research problem on
its own, which will be part of future work.
The second term of the cost function further provides
fairness in the network by penalising those strategies that leave
UEs without coverage. It is defined as δet, where δ is a unit
price paid for each unserved user and et is the fraction of
UEs within the team area that experience SINR levels below
a certain threshold. We remark that since a macro BS can
communicate with the micro BSs in the macrocell, the team
leader has knowledge of the UE density under the coverage
of its team players. Thus, it can easily estimate the fraction
of users, et, depending on the strategy chosen for each of its
players (st) as well as on all other teams’ strategies (s−t).
The total cost function is then given by:
pit(st, s−t) = ξ
∑
l∈Lt
∑
c∈C
a¯l,cs
t
l,c + δet (IV.4)
where ξ and δ indicate the weight that is assigned to each
part of the cost function. Finally, we define the payoff of each
team t as the utility minus the cost paid:
wt(st, s−t) = ut(st, s−t)− pit(st, s−t) . (IV.5)
In summary, we can formulate the problem as a competitive
game G = {T ,S,W}, where T is the set of teams, S is the
comprehensive set of strategies available to the teams, and W
is the set of payoff functions. The objective of each team is to
choose a strategy that maximises its payoff. Because its payoff
depends also on the strategies of the other teams, a team must
make decisions accounting for the strategies, it estimates or
knows, the other teams have selected. Thus, using game-theory
terminology, we will refer to the strategy chosen by a team as
best reply. Moreover, to reduce both power consumption and
the interference towards other teams, a team will select its best
reply among strategies that maximise its payoff, as follows.
(i) Between strategies that are equivalent in terms of payoff,
it will choose the one with the lowest total power, to reduce
the overall power consumption.
(ii) When indifferent between strategies with equal total power
but assigned to different locations, it will select the strategy
that assigns higher power levels to micro BSs that are closer
to the centre of the cell, to minimise interference.
(iii) When indifferent with respect to the two above criteria,
it will choose the strategy that assigns higher power levels to
higher frequency carriers, again, to minimise interference.
B. Game analysis
To analyse the behaviour of the above-defined game, and
discuss the existence of NEs, we rely on the definition of
games of strategic complements/substitutes with aggregation
as provided in [8], [17].
A game Γ = {P,S,W}, where P is the set of players,
and S and W are defined as above, is a game of strategic
substitutes with aggregation if for each player p ∈ P there
exists a best-reply function θp : S−p → Sp such that:
1)θp(I
p) ∈ Θ(Ip) (IV.6)
2)θp is continuous in S−p (IV.7)
3)θp(Iˆ
p) ≤ θp(Ip),∀Iˆp > Ip . (IV.8)
Θ(Ip) is the set of best replies for player p and S−p is
the Cartesian product of the strategy sets of all participating
players other than p. Ip is an additive function of all other
players’ strategies, also referred to as the aggregator [17]:
Ip(s−p) =
∑
p′∈P,p′ 6=p
bp′sp′ (IV.9)
where bp′ are scalar values. Condition 1) is fulfilled whenever
the dependence of the payoff function on the other players’
strategies can be completely encompassed by the aggregator.
Condition 2), also known as the continuity condition, implies
that for each possible value of Ip, the best reply function θp
provides unique best replies. Condition 3) implies that the best
reply of the team decreases with the value of the aggregator.
A game of strategic complements with aggregation is
identical, except for condition 3), which changes into:
θp(Iˆ
p) ≤ θp(Ip),∀Iˆp < Ip , (IV.10)
i.e., in the case of games of strategic complements, the best
reply of the team increases with the value of the aggregator.
Next, we show the following important result.
Theorem 1: Our competitive team-based game G is a game
of strategic complements/substitutes with aggregation.
Proof: For brevity, here we provide a sketch of the proof;
the full proof can be found in [16]. Let us define the aggregator
in our scenario as the interference experienced by a team.
It is easy to see that, in the case of a single-player team
and a single carrier, such aggregator satisfies condition (IV.9),
and that G meets the conditions set out in Eqs. (IV.6)-(IV.7)
and in either Eq. (IV.8) or Eq. (IV.10). The extension to a
multi-carrier game with multi-player teams, implies that the
strategy chosen by the team is not a scalar value but a matrix.
Likewise, the interference experienced by each team (i.e., the
aggregator) is a matrix. Given that, and similarly to the scalar
case, it can be verified that the team best reply, which is an
L × C matrix, fulfils the above conditions. In particular, the
continuity condition (i.e., the existence of unique best replies)
is ensured for any value of the interference matrix by the list
of preferences set out to reduce power consumption and inter-
team interference.
As a further remark to the above result, it is worth stressing
that the cost introduced in Eq. (IV.4) is an important function
that determines whether the game is of strategic complements
or substitutes. Indeed, if we consider the payoff to coincide
with the utility function (i.e., ξ = δ = 0), a team’s best reply
will be to increase its transmit power as the interference grows,
implying that the game is of strategic complements. This
would lead to an NE in which all teams transmit at maximum
power level, without consideration for the interference caused.
Instead, imposing some ξ > 0, the game will turn into a
game of strategic substitutes. This is because the first term
of the cost function is linear with the received power, and
hence increasing with the chosen strategies. Therefore, the
payoff function will start decreasing once the increase in the
chosen transmit powers does not justify the price the team
has to pay. Imposing some δ > 0 (i.e., activating the second
cost component), the relationship between transmit power and
cost becomes more complicated but it does not change the
nature of the game. The fraction of unserved UEs within the
team will be high for very low power strategies, then it will
decrease as the transmit power is increased, and increase again
as the strategies chosen cause high intra-team interference. In
other words, the second cost component strengthens the trend
in the payoff function imposed by the utility for increasing
interference in presence of low power strategies. For those
mid-level strategies that ensure good coverage, it does not
affect the cost function. Instead, it resembles the behaviour
of the first cost component for high power strategies, as it
is still able to discriminate against high power strategies that
may harm the system performance.
Main results from [8], [17] and references therein show that
games of strategic complements/substitutes with aggregation
belong to the class of potential games, specifically to the
subclass of pseudo-potential games. These games admit pure
Nash Equilibria (NE), i.e., action profiles that are a consistent
and stable prediction of the outcome of the game, in the sense
that no player has incentive to unilaterally deviate from such
strategies. Another important result that holds for such games
with a discrete set of strategies is that, thanks to the continuity
condition in Eq. (IV.7), convergence to an NE is ensured by
best reply dynamics [8], [17].
V. THE POWER SETTING ALGORITHM
We now use the above model and results to build a dis-
tributed, low-complexity scheme that enables efficient down-
link power setting on each CC. We first consider a single
carrier and show how the game converges to the best NE
among the possible ones. We target an NE because it is
the only solution of the game that the participating teams
can reach independently, although in principle it may not
be the optimal operational point in terms of utility. We then
extend the algorithm to the multiple-carrier case and discuss
its complexity.
A. Single-carrier scenario
Let us first focus on a single carrier and consider two
possible borderline strategies that a team may adopt: the max-
power strategy in which all locations transmit at the highest
power level, and the min-power strategy in which all locations
transmit at the lowest available power level greater than 0.
Evaluating the utility values obtained for the two extreme
strategies, both at the global and individual team level, it
transpires that the min-power always outperforms the max-
power in a HetNet scenario. Indeed, the inter-tier and inter-
team interference seriously undermine the overall network
performance in terms of global utility, expressed as the sum
of all individual team utilities (see Eqs. (IV.2)–(IV.3) as well
as the results in Fig. 5 in Sec. VI). With regard to the cost, as
discussed in Sec. IV-B, the first component increases with the
increase in the selected transmit power. The second component
strengthens the trend imposed by the first cost component for
the max-power strategy, and by the utility for the min-power
strategy. This leads to the following important result.
Theorem 2: When multiple NEs exist, then the NE with the
least overall power cost will be the preferred NE in terms of
global payoff. This NE will always be reached if players start
by setting their strategies to the lowest power level available.
Proof: The sigmoid function is characterised by a jump
reaching a saturation point. Since the power cost linearly
increases with power, a team’s best reply will coincide with
the lowest strategy that reaches saturation. Let us assume then
that the game has two NEs, in one of which teams tend to
choose higher power levels. Since all teams are playing their
best replies, they are at utility saturation. Thus, playing higher
power level does not ensure higher utility, however it increases
the cost component, hence the payoff will be lower in the
NE with the higher overall transmitted power. A longer, more
formal proof can be found in [16].
We therefore devise the following procedure that should be
executed by each team leader (macro BS), in order to update
the BSs downlink power setting, either periodically or upon
changes in the user traffic or propagation conditions. At a
given update period, all teams initialise their transmit power to
zero. Then, they sequentially run the Best-reply Power Setting
(BPS) algorithm reported in Alg. 1. We refer to the single
execution of the BPS algorithm by any of the teams as an
iteration. Note that the order in which teams play does not
affect the convergence or the outcome of the game, since all
teams start from the zero-power strategy. At each iteration,
the leader of the team that is playing determines the strategy
(i.e., the power level to be used at each BS in the team) that
represents the best reply to the strategies selected so far by
the other teams. The team leader will then notify it to the
neighbouring team leaders that can be affected by this choice.
BPS will be run by the teams till convergence is reached,
which, as shown in Sec. VI, occurs very swiftly. Also, we
remark that the strategies identified over the different iterations
are not actually implemented by the BSs. Only the strategies
representing the game outcome will be implemented by the
BSs, which will set their downlink power accordingly for the
current time period.
In order to detail how the BPS algorithm (Alg. 1) works, let
us consider the generic i+ 1-th iteration and denote the team
that is currently playing by t. The algorithm requires as input
the carrier c at disposal of the BSs and the strategies selected
so far by the other teams, s−tc (i). Additionally, it requires
the cost components weights ξ and δ, the SINR threshold
γmin, used to qualify unserved users, and the utility function
parameters α and β. This latter set of parameters are calculated
offline and provided to the teams by the network operator. The
algorithm loops over all possible strategies in the strategy set
of team t, Stc. For each possible strategy, s, and each location
l within the team, it evaluates the interference experienced by
the tiles within the location area (line 4). This value is used
to calculate the SINR and the utility (lines 5-6), then the first
cost component is updated (line 7). In line 8, it is verified
whether UEs in tile z achieve the minimum SINR value. If
not, the cost component et is amended to include the affected
UEs. The overall team utility for each potential strategy s is
obtained by summing over the individual tile utilities weighted
by the fraction of UEs present in each tile. We recall that
such weight factor ensures that the UE distribution affects the
outcome of the game accordingly. Once the utility and cost
are obtained, the team payoff corresponding to strategy s is
calculated (line 11). After this is done for all possible s, the
leader chooses the strategy st(i+ 1) that maximises the team
payoff. Note that, according to our game model, the arg max?
function in line 12 operates as follows: in case the arg max
function returns more than one strategy, the leader applies the
list of preferences in Sec. IV-A to choose the best strategy.
Algorithm 1 BPS Algorithm run by team t at iteration i+ 1
Require: c, s−tc (i), ξ, δ, α, β, γmin
1: for all s ∈ Stc do
2: Set ut(s, s−tc (i)),w
t(s, s−tc (i)),pi
t(s, s−tc (i)),et to 0
3: for all l ∈ Lt and z ∈ Zl do
4: Compute Itz,c by using Eq. (IV.1)
5: Compute γtz,c by using Eq. (IV.2)
6: ut(s, s−tc (i))← ut(s, s−tc (i)) + EzEt
(
1+e
−α(γtz,c−β)
)
7: pit(s, s−tc (i))← pit(s, s−tc (i)) + ξa¯l,csl,c
8: if γtz,c ≤ γmin then
9: et ← et + EzEt
10: pit(s, s−tc (i))← pit(s, s−tc (i)) + δet)
11: wt(s, s−tc (i))← ut(s, s−tc (i))− pit(s, s−tc (i))
12: stc(i+ 1)← arg max?s wt(s, s−tc (i))
B. Multi-carrier scenario
We now extend the previous procedure to the multi-carrier
case. As mentioned before, the team leader has to decide on the
power level to be used at each available carrier, at each location
within the team. Thus the team strategy is no longer a vector,
but an L × C matrix, each entry (l, c) indicating the power
level to be used for carrier c at location l. A straightforward
extension of Alg. 1 would imply that lines 1–11 are executed
for each element in the new extended strategy set. However,
the new strategy set, depending on the number of carriers, may
become too large and therefore make the algorithm impractical
to use in realistic scenarios.
Analysing the utility expression obtained in Eq. (IV.3), we
can note that since the carriers are in different frequency bands
and have separate power budgets (as foreseen in LTE-A), the
utilities secured at each carrier are independent of each other.
In other words, the utility a team will get at one of the carriers,
is not affected by the strategy chosen at another carrier. The
same holds for the first cost component in Eq. (IV.4). How-
ever, the overall payoff value is dependent on the interaction
between carriers, due to the second cost component. Indeed,
in networks with carrier aggregation support, a UE can be
considered unserved only if the SINR it experiences is below
the threshold in all carriers.
In order to obtain a practical and effective solution in the
multi-carrier scenario, we take advantage of the partial inde-
pendence between the carriers, and run Alg. 1 independently
for each carrier, keeping the size of the strategy set the same
as in the single-carrier scenario. Then, to account for the
dependence exhibited by the second cost component, we set
the order in which the per-carrier games are played, using the
order of preferences listed in the game description. Since the
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Fig. 2. Deviation from optimal strategy: utility, payoff and overall transmitted
power (left) and CDF of the per-user throughput (right).
teams prefer to use high-frequency carriers over low-frequency
ones, due to their smaller interference impact, it is logical that
the game is played starting from the highest-frequency carrier.
It follows that low-frequency carriers will likely be used to
ensure coverage to UEs not served otherwise.
Importantly, our algorithm is still able to converge to an
NE, since surely none of the teams will deviate from the
strategies they chose at each carrier. Also, since the game
for the lowest frequency carrier is played last, the number of
served UEs cannot be further improved without increasing the
power level on the other carriers, which we already know is
not a preferable move as it has not been selected earlier. Thus,
although it does not search throughout the entire solution space
as for the single-carrier scenario, the procedure is still able to
converge to an NE that provides a close-to-optimum tradeoff
among throughput, user coverage and power consumption. The
results obtained in toy scenarios (see Sec. VI) confirm that our
scheme provides performance as good as that achieved by an
exhaustive search in the strategy space.
C. Complexity
The complexity of the algorithm depends largely on the
size of the strategy sets that are available to the teams, St,
since each team has to find the strategy which maximises its
payoff value by searching throughout the entire set. The set
size depends on the number of discrete power levels available
to the BSs (|P |), the number of locations in the team (L) and
the number of CCs available at each location (C). In the single-
carrier scenario, we have |St| = |P |L, while in the multi-
carrier scenario the size exponentially grows to |St| = |P |LC ,
which is reduced to |St| = C|P |L by our approach.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We consider the realistic two-tier LTE HetNet scenario that
is used within 3GPP for evaluating LTE networks [18]. The
network is composed of 57 macrocells and 228 microcells.
Macrocells are controlled by 19 three-sector macro BSs, while
micro BSs are deployed over the coverage area so that there
are 4 non-overlapping microcells per macrocell. The inter-
site distance is set to 500 m. The overall network area is
divided into 2,478 square tiles of equal size. The BSs are
grouped into 57 five-player teams, each consisting of 1 macro
BS and 4 micro BSs within its macrocell. There are about
34,400 UEs in the area, distributed non-uniformly with a user
density around micro BSs that is three times higher than over
Fig. 3. BPS strategies for a 57-team game for CC1 (top left), CC2 (top
right) and CC3 (bottom). Darker shades represent higher power level, while
the white color corresponds to the off state. Hexagons are macro BSs while
circles are micro BSs.
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Fig. 4. BPS strategies for a 57-team game: chosen strategies by macro (left)
and micro (right) BSs.
the macro BS coverage area. All UEs are assumed to be CA
enabled. BSs can use three CCs, each 10 MHz wide, with the
central frequencies: 2.6 GHz (CC1), 1.8 GHz (CC2) and 800
MHz (CC3). We assume a slow-fading environment, where
signal attenuation and losses follow the ITU specification for
urban environments [14], while the SINR values are mapped
to throughput using the look-up table in [19]. The maximum
transmit powers for macro and micro BSs are set at 20 W and
1 W, respectively. The set of discrete power levels is given
by P = {0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1}, each representing a fraction of
the maximum power. The game is played by all teams using
the algorithm for the multiple-carrier scenario. The sigmoid
function parameters are α = 1 and β = 1, which were selected
as the most appropriate to model the relationship between the
selected strategy and final user rate. The SINR threshold is set
at γmin = −10 dB, based on [19].
Using our results in [16], the value of the cost parameter is
set as ξ = kα
I¯
, where k is the weight factor used to indicate
the importance we place on the first cost component and I¯ is
an average value for interference calculated by the network
operator, obtained by fixing the transmit power of all teams
at half the maximum power. Unless otherwise specified, the
weight factor k is set to 0.25 while δ = 0.6. These values were
selected based on their effect on the performance metrics, as
shown below in the simulation results.
The performance of the algorithm is first compared to
the optimum in a toy scenario. In the large-scale scenario
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(middle) and CDF of the per-user throughput (right).
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described above, it is instead compared to that of four baseline
strategies: the two fixed power strategies max-power and min-
power, as well as to the max-power strategy coupled with
eICIC technique, as usually applied in the literature and in
practice, and with the Low Power - ABS (LP-ABS) technique
[2]. Traditional eICIC is applied with CRE for microcells set
at 8 dB and macro BS downlink transmissions muted in 25%
of subframes (ABS). These values were chosen to represent
the mid-range of those applied in the surveyed literature [3]
LP-ABS uses a 6 dB microcell biasing, ABS subframe ratio
of 50% and macro BS power reduction of 6 dB during ABS,
which were shown to perform best in [2]. Note that for the
strategy reached via the BPS algorithm and the two fixed
power strategies, user association is distance-based and fixed,
while for the power strategies coupled with eICIC, it is based
on the strongest received pilot signal plus the bias, to properly
model the CRE behaviour.
In Fig. 2 we compare BPS in a multi-carrier setting with
the optimal solution obtained via exhaustive search. Due to the
problem complexity, the comparison is performed only for a
toy scenario in which two teams compete, each consisting of
one macro and one micro BS. The results, obtained by aver-
aging the behaviour of ten different sets of teams, show that
there is negative deviation in terms of payoff as expected, but
BPS yields higher utility. Looking at the per-user throughput
CDF curves, however, we note that the two strategies perform
almost identically.
In Fig. 3, we look at a snapshot of the NE strategy reached
via the BPS algorithm, in a game with 57 teams. The strategies
chosen by the teams for each CC are differentiated using
different shades, from white (zero power) to black (maximum
power). Hexagons represent the macro BS, while circles
represent micro BSs. The figure shows that CC1, i.e., the high
frequency carrier, allows for higher transmit power to be used
by both macro and micro BSs, due to its low interference
impact. CC1 can be also used simultaneously by macro and
micro BSs in the same team, which is not always the case
for the other two CCs. CC2 and CC3 are used to complement
each other to ensure overall coverage. Histograms of chosen
strategies for macro and micro BSs, shown in Fig. 4, confirm
these observations. Here note that CC1 is activated for most
macro and micro BSs, however macro BSs often set low power
levels for CC1, while most micro BSs set CC1 at maximum
power level. On the contrary, CC2 is rarely activated for macro
BSs, while CC3 (the low frequency CC) is the least utilised,
and tends to be especially unfavored by micro BSs, due to its
high interfering impact. These results validate the intuition that
far reaching low-frequency carriers are not appropriate to be
used by micro BSs, rather they should be used only to ensure
broader coverage for edge UEs.
Next, in the left and middle plots of Fig. 5 we compare
the performance of the strategy reached via our scheme
(labelled by “BPS”) to the fixed baseline strategies, in terms
of global utility and overall transmitted power, and for a
varying number of teams. The strategy reached via the BPS
mechanism outperforms all other solutions in terms of global
utility, calculated as the sum of the individual team utilities.
Also, the gap in performance grows with the number of teams.
This gain in performance is achieved at much lower transmit
power, which implies that the BPS strategy is very efficient.
The overall transmit power of the BPS strategy, calculated
as the sum of the selected transmit powers over all BSs and
CCs in the network, closely approaches that of the min-power
strategy and is much lower than the power consumption of all
other schemes. Also, as anticipated in Sec. V-A, the min-power
strategy always outperforms the max-power strategy in terms
of utility, regardless of the number of teams, while keeping
the overall transmit power at the minimum level.
The final comparison is performed in the rightmost plot
of Fig. 5, which depicts the cumulative distributive function
(CDF) of the per-user throughput for the strategies under
consideration. Overall, our solution outperforms all other
schemes. This holds especially for the top 70% of UEs. eICIC
and LP-ABS give slightly better results in ensuring a positive
throughput to the worst UEs. However, BPS provides a very
low fraction of UEs that are left unserved (about 2%), while
transmitting at much lower overall power. Note also that the
strategies with eICIC and LP-ABS are at a slight advantage
since user association is performed based on the best downlink
pilot signal, which, at least for downlink communication, is
always better than the fixed distance-based user association
scheme that we assumed for simplicity. In summary, it is
clear that BPS is a very well-balanced strategy in terms of
level of service: it provides slightly lower per-user throughput
than eICIC and LP-ABS for the worst UEs, but much better
throughput than all other strategies for the rest of the UEs,
and it consumes very little power (almost the same as the
min-power strategy).
In Fig. 6, we look at the behaviour of our algorithm. First,
we evaluate the effect of k, i.e., the weight we assign to the
cost of received power, on the global utility and the fraction of
low SINR users, by varying its value from 0 to 1 and fixing
δ = 0.6. We see that increasing k is beneficial in terms of
global utility (solid, blue line), but only up to some value
(around 0.4). Beyond that, the global utility experiences a
sharp drop, which signifies that, due to the high power price,
BPS is more inclined to provide strategies that optimise power
consumption rather than the utility. Also, k has little effect on
the fraction of unserved users (dashed, green line): just a small
improvement can be noticed around k = 0.25. Conversely, the
cost parameter δ plays an instrumental role in ensuring that the
number of UEs experiencing an SINR below the acceptable
threshold is kept low, as can be seen by the dashed green
line in the second plot of Fig. 6 (here k = 0.25). The third
plot depicts the effect of k (solid, blue line) on the overall
transmitted power when δ = 0.6, and the effect of δ (dashed,
green line) when k = 0.25. Note that increasing k leads BPS
to converge to strategies with overall lower power, however,
as observed before, this comes at the expense of the utility.
As expected, the increase in δ does not lead to strategies
with higher overall transmit power, which confirms our earlier
statement that introducing the second cost component does not
change the nature of the game.
Finally, the rightmost plot presents the average number of
iterations it takes to each team to converge to the final best
strategy. Depending on the intra-team dynamics, teams may
take a different time, however the game always converges quite
fast (in about 8 iterations). Importantly, the average number
of iterations required by each team does not grow with the
number of teams.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a novel solution for downlink power setting
in HetNets with carrier aggregation, which aims to reduce
interference and power consumption, and to provide high
quality of service to users. Our approach leverages the different
propagation conditions of the carriers and the different transmit
power that macro and micro BSs can use for them. Through
game theory, we framed the problem as a competitive game
among teams of macro and micro BSs, and identified it as a
game of strategic substitutes/complements with aggregation.
We then introduced a distributed algorithm that enables the
teams to reach a desirable NE in very few iterations. Simu-
lation results, obtained in a realistic scenario, show that our
solution greatly outperforms the existing strategies in terms of
global performance while consuming little power.
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